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Herbert Zech*
Building a European Data Economy – The European 
Commission’s Proposal for a Data Producer’s Right
The European Commission’s Communication “Building a European Data Economy”, dated 
10th January 2017, contains inter alia a proposal to introduce a “data producer’s right”.1 
Whether such an exclusive right to use data should be introduced or not has already been 
debated extensively in European literature.2 This article focuses instead on the possible de-
tails of such a data producer’s right. The article is structured in accordance with the current 
proposal of the European Commission, which outlines the concept of a possible “data prop-
erty” very precisely and in a dogmatically consistent way. However, this should not marginal-
ize the question of whether or not such a right should be introduced for economic or other 
reasons.3 The Commission’s Communication emphasises explicitly that the data producer’s 
right is only one possible building block of a future European legal framework for the data 
economy. For example, it can be combined with other building blocks such as the proposed 
default contract rules and – based on these – a contract fairness control (even in business-to-
business cases); or with access rights to data (access against remuneration). However, there 
is also the possibility that it will not become part of the future legal framework at all.4 The 
possible effects of a data producer’s right and their evaluation from an economic point of 
view are primarily a task for further economic (and especially empirical) research. However, 
* Prof. Dr. jur. Dipl.-Biol., Professor of Life Sciences Law and Intellectual Property Law, University 
of Basel, Faculty of Law.
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13.
2 Cf. Zech, Information as a tradable commodity, in: De Franceschi (eds.), European Contract 
Law and the Digital Single Market, 2016, 51; Becker, Schutzrechte an Maschinendaten und 
die Schnittstelle zum Personendatenschutz, in: Büscher et al. (eds.), Markt-Kommunikation 
zwischen Geistigem Eigentum und Verbraucherschutz, Festschrift Karl-Heinz Fezer, 2016, 
815. Critical: OECD, Maximising the Economic and Social Value of Data, http://www.oecd.
org/internet/ieconomy/enhanced-data-access.htm (accessed on 7th September 2017); Kerber, 
A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic Analysis, GRUR 
Int 2016, 989; Drexl et al., Ausschließlichkeits- und Zugangsrechte an Daten, Positionspapier 
des Max-Planck-Instituts für Innovation und Wettbewerb vom 16. August 2016 zur aktuellen 
europäischen Debatte, 12; Zimmer, Fragwürdiges Eigentum an Daten, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 18. 11. 2016, 16; Plattform Industrie 4.0, “Industrie 4.0” – wie das Recht Schritt hält, 
Ergebnispapier, 2016, 22.
3 See e. g. Kerber, A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic 
Analysis, GRUR Int 2016, 989.
4 Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the Euro-
pean data economy, accompanying the document; Communication “Building a European Data 
Economy”, SWD(2017) 2 final, 30.
ZGE /  IPJ 9 (2017), 317–330 DOI: 10.1628/186723717X15069451170892 
ISSN 1867-237X © 2017 Mohr Siebeck
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
? 
13
1.
15
2.
21
1.
59
 T
hu
, 0
1 
M
ar
 2
01
8 
16
:5
3:
49
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
318 Herbert Zech
to gauge the possible effects, a precise dogmatic concept is needed as a basis. The follow-
ing aspects will be discussed: (I.) The scope of protection (scope of the right), (II.) the object 
of protection (scope of data covered), (III.) the original right holder (allocation to a person 
or entity), (IV.) the exceptions and limitations (exceptions to the right) and (V.) the interplay 
with other legal rules (intended effects and flanking measures).
I. The Scope of Protection
The communication starts – unlike conventional texts on intellectual property 
rights – with a description of the scope of protection (i. e. the allocated uses). 
This makes sense from a practical point of view because the current discussion 
on “data property” focuses primarily on the allocation of certain uses of data and 
especially on the analysis of raw data by big data tools.5
1. The “right to use and authorize the use of non-personal data”  
as an exclusive right (“data ownership”)
The Commission defines the data producer’s right as a “right to use and authorize 
the use of non-personal data”.6 The resulting comprehensive allocation of the use 
of data reminds the reader of parallel intellectual property law rules like § 9 PatG 
(German Patent Act) or § 15 UrhG (German Copyright Act; the provision lists 
single uses or competences such as a bundle of rights but only as special cases of 
a general allocation). Taking copyright as an example, the allocated uses (com-
petences) should particularly encompass not only the copying and the material 
or immaterial display of data but also the analysis of data – independent of any 
copying associated with the analysis. To clarify, data-related value chains typi-
cally consist of the production, collection (or aggregation) and analysis of data; 
whereas the actual knowledge derived from such data may only ultimately lead 
to product innovations. Based on such a depiction of data value change, the allo-
cated data use should encompass the level of data collection as well as the level of 
data analysis. It should be noted that it would be advisable to limit allocated uses 
to commercial uses, since further protection against uses in the private sphere for 
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 9 sq.; Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of 
data and emerging issues of the European data economy, Accompanying the document, Com-
munication “Building a European Data Economy”, SWD(2017) 2 final, 12 sqq.; Zech, “Industrie 
4.0” – Rechtsrahmen für eine Datenwirtschaft im digitalen Binnenmarkt, GRUR 2015, 1151, 
1152.
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13.
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319Building a European Data Economy
non-commercial purposes (cf. § 11 No. 1 PatG) seems unnecessary. If a private 
person uses data only for his or her own personal purposes this should not harm 
commercial interests in the data.
2. Other concepts, especially non-exclusive property rights
The exclusive allocation of uses of data distinguishes a data producer’s right 
(being a proper exclusive right) from other legal concepts. Thus, other possible 
rights to data (which to a certain extent already exist under current law) are also 
discussed by legal commentators: inter alia, the mere protection of the integrity 
of data7, non-exclusive rights to data (protection of an existing access to data, 
access rights to data),8 protection of factual exclusivity (especially protection of 
trade secrets) and mere defensive rights against the use of data (classical func-
tion of data protection law).9
Recently, the concept of a non-exclusive property right (i. e. a transferable non-
exclusive right to use data including the necessary access) has been discussed 
more intensively.10 It would be effective erga omnes and transferable like owner-
 7 Concerning the controversy about the protection of stored data (data files) by an “other right” 
(sonstiges Recht) according to § 823(1) BGB (German Civil Code) see Zech, Information als 
Schutzgegenstand, 2012, 386; Faust, Digitale Wirtschaft – Analoges Recht: Braucht das BGB ein 
Update?, Gutachten zum 71. Deutschen Juristentag, 2016, 48 sq.; Concerning the protection by 
penal law according to § 303a StGB (German Penal Code) as well as the liability in civil law ac-
cording to § 823(2) BGB (German Civil Code) see ibid., 394 sqq.
 8 The access to an e-mail account, for example, may be protected by an “other right” (sonstiges 
Recht) according to § 823(1) BGB; Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand, 131 sq. Antitrust 
law may give rise to access rights. These are also discussed in the Communication from the 
Commission as access against remuneration; cf. Drexl et al., Ausschließlichkeits- und Zugangsre-
chte an Daten, Positionspapier des Max-Planck-Instituts für Innovation und Wettbewerb vom 
16. August 2016 zur aktuellen europäischen Debatte, 2 sqq., 10 sqq.; Körber, Ist Wissen Mark-
tmacht? – Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Datenschutz, “Datenmacht” und Kartellrecht in: 
Immenga/Körber (eds.), Daten und Wettbewerb in der digitalen Ökonomie, Referate der 5. 
Göttinger Kartellrechtsgespräche vom 22. Januar 2016, 81, 96 sqq.
 9 There is an intense discussion concerning whether the data protection law, which has only just 
been consolidated by the EU General Data Protection Regulation, should be developed further 
into a property law. That would only be the case if granting permission to process personal data 
would amount to a partial transfer of rights despite the free revocability of consent (see Metzger, 
Dienst gegen Daten: Ein synallagmatischer Vertrag, AcP 2016, 817, 832; Zech, “Industrie 4.0” – 
Rechtsrahmen für eine Datenwirtschaft im digitalen Binnenmarkt, GRUR 2015, 1151, 1154 sq.) 
or if the revocability of consent would be limited de lege ferenda. For details see Liedke, Die Ein-
willigung im Datenschutzrecht, 2012, 29 sqq; Rogosch, Die Einwilligung im Datenschutzrecht, 
2013, 132 sqq.
10 See e. g. Van Asbroeck/Debussche/César (Bird & Bird), Building the European Data Economy, 
Data Ownership, White Paper, 2017, 120 sqq.; cf. Drexl et al, Position Statement of the Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 26 April 2017 on the European Commis-
sion’s “Public consultation on Building the European Data Economy”, 9: “Rather than estab-
lishing a new property rights system, the better solution would therefore consist in recognising 
a targeted and non-waivable data access right.”; Drexl (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition), Building the European Data Economy, public consultation, response to ques-
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320 Herbert Zech
ship but without exclusivity. Such a concept would be feasible because data is a 
non-rival good which can be used without interfering with other parties using 
the same data at the same time.11 However, the question remains whether the 
introduction of such a novel, non-exclusive property right would serve any pur-
pose. Such a right would only make sense in scenarios where data is held exclu-
sively (e. g. by secrecy or technical protection measures) and the party holding 
the data is not willing to grant access to parties interested in using the data non-
exclusively. As an example, the data stored in a smart car may not be accessible 
to the car owner but only to the car manufacturer, who in turn is not willing to 
grant access to third parties such as big data analysts. If the car owner assigns the 
non-exclusive property right to the analyst, the analyst may claim access to the 
data in usable form from the car manufacturer. Furthermore, should the data be 
transferred from the car manufacturer to other storage providers the analyst may 
claim whoever controls the data. However, the car manufacturer is free to use the 
data and transfer them to whoever he or she wants.
Notwithstanding the question whether such a right should be introduced at 
all, care should be taken to ensure the use of clear terminology. A non-exclusive 
right to use data may be called a property right if it is transferable but it should 
not be referred to as data ownership.12 The concept of ownership at least indicates 
an exclusive entitlement modelled after property rights in tangible assets. There 
is a close connection to the access rights mentioned in the Communication (see 
below V.2.). However, the concept of non-exclusive property means transferable 
rights. This would enable the right holder to trade the data without actually ac-
cessing the data. In cases where the use requires technological skill (e. g. big data 
analyses), proper access (i. e. in the right form or standard) might only be feasible 
for professional data analysts. A non-skilled right holder (e. g. a car owner) might 
therefore be interested in trading the mere right of use. The analyst might then 
go on to claim access against the entity controlling the data. In data protection 
law, similar problems are addressed by the concept of data portability (Art. 20 
General Data Protection Regulation13).14 However, the focus of data portability is 
tionnaire, accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/publication/European-Data-Economy-
Consultation (accessed on 1st July 2017): “As an alternative, our Institute therefore recommends 
considering legislation on an unwaivable right of data access for the device user (see attach-
ment). Similar to the right of data portability under EU General Data Protection Regulation, 
such a right could unlock the data held by the manufacturer for data analyses that are either 
conducted in-house by the holder of that right or provided as a service by third-party data ana-
lysts without creating additional access problems.”
11 Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand, 71.
12 Cf. Van Asbroeck/Debussche/César (Bird & Bird), Building the European Data Economy, Data 
Ownership, White Paper, 2017, 120 sqq.
13 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
14 Cf. Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data – Between Propertisation and 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
? 
13
1.
15
2.
21
1.
59
 T
hu
, 0
1 
M
ar
 2
01
8 
16
:5
3:
49
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
321Building a European Data Economy
rather the accessibility (and usability on multiple platforms) by the original right 
holder (which is why the right can be constructed as unwaivable15) than trading 
data and giving access to third parties. It also needs to be discussed whether trad-
ing non-exclusive uses of data may also be facilitated in a much simpler way by 
safeguarding the assignability of access rights (i. e. claims against the data hold-
ers), i. e. introducing access rights (see below V.3.) with mandatory assignability.
Within existing law, role models for non-exclusive rights are rare. There seem 
to be no transferable non-exclusive absolute rights originating from the creation 
of the object of property. However, non-exclusive licenses, derived from exclusive 
rights in non-rival intangible assets (like copyright law) may serve as a compa-
rable legal instrument. The difference is that these non-exclusive rights are de-
rived from an exclusive property right. Under German copyright law, according 
to § 34(1) UrhG, licenses may only be transferred with the consent of the author 
who in turn may not refuse the consent against good faith.
There is also another difference between non-exclusive licenses and the non-
exclusive property rights under discussion: Many non-exclusive licenses may be 
created in the same object of property (the protected work). However, it is con-
ceivable that also a non-exclusive property right may be licensed non-exclusively. 
As a result, the original right holder could enable multiple potential users to 
access and use the data. Moreover, it has to be discussed whether a non-exclu-
sive property right may also be transferred multiple times (which could also be 
achieved by giving the original right holder an indefinite number of non-exclu-
sive property rights). On the one hand, this would create an indefinite number 
f non-exclusive use-rights which (unlike non-exclusive licenses) may be freely 
transferred to other parties. On the other hand, it could also be stipulated that 
the original right holder may transfer the right only once and not license it at all.
If such a non-exclusive property right is considered, the key question is who 
should be enabled to trade the non-exclusive possibility to use the data. This 
depends on who is deemed to be the original right holder. The most likely idea 
would be to use the first ownership concepts already discussed for exclusive 
rights to data, especially the data producer (see below III.).16
Access, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 16–13 2016, 
SSRN 2862975, 56 sqq.
15 Cf. Drexl et al, Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
of 26 April 2017 on the European Commission’s “Public consultation on Building the European 
Data Economy”, 9; consequently, Drexl et al, Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for 
Innovation and Competition of 26 April 2017 on the European Commission’s “Public consul-
tation on Building the European Data Economy”, proposes a further restriction: “The right of 
access should be limited to the purpose of conducting data analysis in the interest of the entitled 
person, irrespective of whether this analysis is organized within the company of the entitled 
person or out-sourced to an independent data analysis service provider.” The resulting right is 
clearly not aimed at creating a market for raw data.
16 Similar Drexl (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition), Building the European 
Data Economy, public consultation, response to questionnaire, accessible at https://ec.europa.
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322 Herbert Zech
II. The Object of Property (Definition of Data)
If the scope of protection (the allocated competences) is defined as the use of 
data, then the term data – and therefore the object of protection – must inevitably 
be defined more precisely. Only when they are based on such a precise definition 
it is possible to distinguish data-related actions (defined as uses of data within 
the scope of protection) from actions which are only deemed to take advantage of 
data indirectly and therefore lie outside the scope of protection. In a very broad 
sense, data may be defined as information coded to be machine readable.17 This 
interpretation entails data being defined as the result of a coding process and 
therefore as a number of signs or syntactical information. The European Com-
mission chooses such an approach by clarifying that “independent of this scope, 
it is important to frame [the right] so that only the syntactical level of informa-
tion is protected, not the semantic level”.18 This is based on the distinction of the 
level of signs and the level of physical carriers (semantic, syntactic and structural 
information).19 The European Commission stresses correctly that a data produc-
er’s right should not lead to the propertisation (exclusive allocation) of semantic 
information, which would curtail the public domain more strongly than the mere 
allocation on the syntactic level: “Care also needs to be taken so that any new 
right to data is not conceived as a super-IP right. It should only cover the syntac-
tical (data code) level, but not the encoded ideas or information it contains.”20 
This concept is different to the one underlying data protection law, under which 
personal data (Art. 4 No. 1 General Data Protection Regulation) are defined as 
“information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”. Data relat-
ing to preclinical and clinical trials (Directive 2001/83/EC21) are defined as se-
mantic information as well. So far, the definition of data on a syntactic level for 
legal purposes has only been discussed in criminal law, especially under § 303a 
StGB (German Penal Code).
Another purpose of restricting the object of protection is achieved by only pro-
tecting machine-generated data. This is defined by the European Commission as 
eu/eusurvey/publication/European-Data-Economy-Consultation (accessed on 1st July 2017): 
“device user”.
17 Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand, 32 (with further references); idem, JIPITEC 2015, 192, 
193.
18 Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the Euro-
pean data economy, accompanying the document: Communication “Building a European Data 
Economy”, SWD(2017) 2 final, 34.
19 See Zech, Information as Property, JIPITEC 2015, 192.
20 Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the Euro-
pean data economy, accompanying the document: Communication “Building a European Data 
Economy”, SWD(2017) 2 final, 34.
21 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on 
the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJEU L 311 from 28. 11. 
2001, 67).
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323Building a European Data Economy
follows: “machine-generated data is created without the direct intervention of a 
human by computer processes, applications or services, or by sensors processing 
information received from equipment, software or machinery, whether virtual 
or real”.22 Especially, this means that software programmed by humans is not en-
compassed. A typical example of machine-generated data is data produced by a 
highly or fully automated car, or by a sensor-equipped production machine (es-
pecially as a part of Industry 4.0/cyber-physical systems industry applications). 
Such data are the direct result of measuring or recording processes and therefore 
do not fulfil the requirement of being an intellectual creation, as described in 
copyright law. These data are typically produced without being refined by soft-
ware, which is why they are also known as raw data (as opposed to analysis data 
which are derived from or produced by analysing the raw data).23
Any further restrictions employed by the European Commission with respect 
to the relationship with data protection law would seem unnecessary (at least 
from a dogmatic point of view). According to the Commission’s Notice, only 
such data shall be encompassed which do not contain personal information.24 If 
a data producer’s right is used as an instrument to allocate the value of raw data 
(which analysis makes use of – but at the same time creates – additional value), 
this rationale applies to non-personal data as well as to personal data. However, 
it may become necessary to make the distinction due to the differing legal al-
l cation (i. e. allocation to the data subject instead of to the data producer). At 
least, this would be necessary if data protection law could be perceived to be a 
kind of property law. Any restricting of the scope of application of a possible data 
producer’s right devised by the European Commission might rather be due to 
questions of legislative competence, and to the fact that with the General Data 
Protection Regulation, a fiercely contended milestone in the development of 
data protection law has just been reached. The distinction between the two legal 
regimes also has the advantage of being easily understandable. The underlying, 
basic value-oriented legal decisions – most especially the question of who will 
profit from the value of the data – should be openly addressed and decided by 
the legislator, taking all relevant interests into account.
22 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 9.
23 Concerning the legal situation of raw data created by machines, see: Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and So-
cial Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data Economy”, 
COM(2017) 9 final, 10; Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand, 176.
24 Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the Euro-
pean data economy, accompanying the document: Communication “Building a European Data 
Economy”, SWD(2017) 2 final, 4.
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324 Herbert Zech
III. The Original Right Holder, First Ownership (Data Producer)
Apart from the question of whether a new exclusive right to data should be cre-
ated at all, the most controversial issue brings into question to whom such a 
right should be attributed. One of the key problems is which person can clearly 
be defined as a possible original right holder (first owner). Only if such a person 
is clearly definable the discussion can proceed as to whether an exclusive right 
should be attributed to this person or not.
The Commission proposes attributing an exclusive right to the data producer: 
The right “could be granted to the ‘data producer’, i. e. the owner or long term 
user (i. e. the lessee) of the device”25 or “the persons or entities that operate 
sensor-equipped machines, tools or devices at their own economic risk (‘data 
producer’)”.26 Such an allocation can be justified with a systematic argument 
drawing a parallel to the attribution of rights to the data base producer (§ 87a(2) 
UrhG, Article 7 Database Directive27), to the producers of phonograms (§ 85(1) 
UrhG, Article 3(2) Directive 2006/116/EC28) and to the press publisher (§ 87f(1) 
UrhG), but also – within property law – to the producer of a new tangible asset 
(§ 950(1) BGB (German Civil Code)).29 The attribution to the data producer 
may also be justified with the idea of a parallel attribution of risks and benefits 
(internalisation of negative and positive externalities), especially if the data are 
produced by machines which are subject to special strict liability rules allocat-
ing the risks of running such a machine to the person in charge of running it.30
However, the difficulty of attributing data production to a single machine run 
by a clearly identifiable, economically responsible person – especially with con-
25 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13.
26 European Committee survey for a public consultation regarding its “Building a European Data 
Economy” policy documents, accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/pdf/survey/70852?la 
n g = E N &unique=60e14e2c-f225–42c0-ae73–921a76aa0a30 (accessed on 1st July 2017), 34.
27 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases (Database Directive).
28 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
the terms of protection of copyright and certain related rights.
29 Concerning the determination of the processor who is economically responsible or authorized 
to give instructions see Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand, 270 sqq. (with further refer-
ences); The producer of a new tangible asset who acquires ownership is not the worker who ac-
tually performs the productive process but rather the employer who is economically responsible 
and is authorised to give instructions.
30 Concerning the argument of attributing risks and benefits in parallel see Zech, “There’s no such 
thing as a free lunch” – Die Zuweisung von Chancen und Risiken im Life Sciences-Recht, Basler 
Juristische Mitteilungen (BJM) 2014, 1, 12 sqq.; Zech, Gefährdungshaftung und neue Technolo-
gien, JZ 2013, 21, 26. Concerning strict liability regarding data producing machines in particu-
lar, see also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a 
European Data Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13 sqq.
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325Building a European Data Economy
nected machines, which are part of an entire machine network owned by differ-
ent people, – can be accurately argued. The increasing level of connectivity (the 
future traffic situation with automated cars can be cited as a primary example) 
makes the distinction of individual machines increasingly difficult. If, however, 
a single data producing machine can be identified, the concept of an economi-
cally responsible person in charge of running the machine poses no special legal 
problems. Such a concept is, for instance, familiar from trust asset cases and can 
be easily understood by the examples given by the Commission like the lessee or, 
if special contractual relations do not exist, the owner.
IV. Exceptions and Limitations
As with all intellectual property rights, the proposed exceptions and limitations 
to the discussed data producer’s right are of special interest. These are to guaran-
tee that the public domain is curtailed to the smallest possible extent and for this 
reason, the Commission named several important data usage cases which should 
be exempt from a data producer’s right.
The first case is the use of data by the producer of a data-generating product. 
In cases where the producer needs to use the data to fulfil a legal obligation to 
monitor products on the market, such a limitation is easily comprehensible.31 
Even as far as product safety and security in general are at stake, such a limita-
tion makes sense – at least if the use of the data is necessary to ensure safety and 
security. However, a limitation without compensation for the general purpose of 
enhancing the product (i. e. for further development that is not safety and secu-
rity related) is less convincing.32 This seems to be a question of open competi-
tion in which the producer of the product and the competitors should be treated 
equally. A functioning market for the data produced by the product enables the 
right holder to sell the data to the person who, from a welfare perspective, can 
make the best use of them. This might be the producer but could also be one of 
the competitors. It is understood that friction may arise with the protection of 
trade secrets (especially concerning the illegality of reverse engineering under 
German law which, however, may change with the new Know-How-Directive33). 
31 See Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the 
European data economy, accompanying the document: Communication “Building a European 
Data Economy”, SWD(2017) 2 final, 35: “legal obligation to monitor the behaviour of [one’s] 
products on the market” (Produktbeobachtungspflicht).
32 “For the purposes of further improving product design”, Commission Staff Working Document 
on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the European data economy, accompanying the 
document: Communication “Building a European Data Economy”, SWD(2017) 2 final, 35.
33 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2016 on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their un-
lawful acquisition, use and disclosure (Know-How-Directive).
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Be that as it may, this should not tempt the legislator to allocate the use of data to 
the producer of data generating products without proper cause.
A clear case of limitation for public benefit is the free use for certain authori-
ties, especially for the purposes of statistics or other public welfare tasks (statisti-
cal information, urban planning, environmental protection, civil protection etc.). 
This would seem self-evident.
Less self-evident but at least plausible are limitations which benefit third par-
ties in cases of their data use benefitting public interest (public interest in making 
certain data available for several private entities).34 This corresponds to a discus-
sion about new access rights to privately held data which are mentioned in the 
Commissions Notice as another possible building block of a legal framework for 
a data economy (access against remuneration35). The proposed limitations show 
that such access rights may well be combined with a data producer’s right.
Finally, the Commissions Notice mentions limitations for scientific research 
as a privileged use of data. Such a scientific limitation can also be applied to the 
sui generis right for the maker of a database under § 87c(2) UrhG, Article 9 lit. 
b Database Directive. It should be discussed whether such a limitation should 
only benefit research within public institutions (such as universities) for non-
commercial purposes, or whether it should also benefit commercial research 
and development. One argument against the extension of such a limitation to 
commercial purposes would be that it might render the limitation ineffective as 
it would be possible to label every conceivable data analysis as a research activity. 
Drawing a parallel to the research exception under patent law (§ 11 No. 2 PatG), 
such usage may rather be classified as using the object of protection as a research 
tool rather than as gathering information about the object of protection (such a 
use not only occurs in patent law but also within software protection in the form 
of decompilation (§ 69e UrhG, Article 6 Directive 2009/24/EC36)). However, in 
the case of raw data, such a use would only be conceivable in a handful of cases 
such as copying, in order to clarify the type of coding.
In addition to the limitations mentioned in the Communication, more limita-
tions could be implemented, especially limitations governing usage within the 
private sphere for non-commercial purposes as well as for educational use. To 
prevent hold-ups regarding the use of data, a compulsory license for certain data 
analyses could be envisaged. This could be implemented instead of the limita-
34 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 36.
35 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13.
36 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
legal protection of computer programs.
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tions for certain public uses proposed by the Commission; or could complement 
them in cases where public welfare aspects are less prominent. As a parallel to 
such a rule, the patent law compulsory license in cases of dependent inventions 
(§ 24(2) PatG) does not require a special public interest to be mentioned. This 
rule fulfils a key function in patent law by preventing hold-up effects for follow-
on inventions, at the same time insuring the right holder’s economic participa-
tion.37
V. Interplay with other Areas of Law
The proposed data producer’s right – like the other proposed measures (e. g. ac-
cess against remuneration) – has been called a “possibility” by the Commission 
(i. e. these measures are not exclusive but may – and should – also be combined). 
If it is to be introduced at all, it is feasible that the data producer’s right will only 
function in conjunction with other legal rules.
1. Contract law
First and foremost, there is contract law. A data producer’s right would be inef-
fective if it could be “contracted away” by the terms and conditions of a contract. 
With its decision for an original allocation (first ownership) and with its exemp-
tions and limitations, such a right could serve as the basis for a fairness control of 
contracts, especially for the control of terms and conditions. This is also explic-
itly addressed by the Commission, which mentions “default contract rules”38 and 
which could be used for the review of contracts (cf. § 307(2) No. 1 and 2 BGB39). 
The most hotly debated question is whether such a fairness control should also 
take place in business-to-business cases. The Commission explicitly mentions 
these cases and answers the question in the affirmative.40
37 Concerning sequential and cumulative innovation as a challenge for patent law and other intel-
lectual property rights see Zech, Neue Technologien als Herausforderung für die Rechtfertigung 
des Immaterialgüterrechtsschutzes, in: Hilty/Jaeger/Lamping (eds.), Herausforderung Innova-
tion, Berlin/Heidelberg 2012, 87 sqq.; cf. Krusemarck, Die abhängige Schöpfung im Recht des 
geistigen Eigentums, 2013, 289 sqq.
38 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 12.
39 Whereas No. 1 pertains to central purposes of legal provisions as the basis for a fairness control, 
No. 2 pertains to central obligations of a contract.
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 12.
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2. Data protection law
The role of data protection law has already been contemplated. It is impossible to 
separate the question as to whether and with what content a data producer’s right 
should be introduced from the discussion about the future role of data protection 
law. It is impossible to overemphasize the fundamental importance of the ques-
tion as to whether the allocation of the value of raw data should be left to free 
and unhindered competition; whether it should be attributed economically to the 
data producer; or whether, in the special case of personal data, it should be attrib-
uted to the person concerned. If the data economy is to function and be accepted 
by the consumer, settling this question becomes an issue of great importance.
3. Access rights
The Commission explicitly mentions the possible introduction of new access 
rights as “access against remuneration”.41 New access rights for private data users 
might be instituted in cases where data usage is in a special public interest, or 
where it may be regarded as useful solely from an economic perspective. Under 
certain circumstances, the existing law may provide such access rights under 
competition law (data as an essential facility, leveraging of a dominant position 
etc.). However, competition law is not regarded to be sufficient.42 Whether the 
introduction of new access rights is dangerous for the data economy or whether 
it might be beneficial (at least for clearly defined cases) must be determined by 
further economic analysis.
4. Liability law: product liability for data-generating products
Finally, the Commission also explicitly mentions liability law.43 The specific risks 
of “emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT), the factories of 
the future and autonomous connected systems” have to be addressed.44 This 
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13.
42 Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data – Between Propertisation and Ac-
cess, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 16–13, 2016, 
SSRN 2862975, 26; Körber, Ist Wissen Marktmacht? – Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Dat-
enschutz, “Datenmacht” und Kartellrecht in: Körber/Immenga (eds.), Daten und Wettbewerb 
in der digitalen Ökonomie, 81, 96 sqq.; Zimmer, Fragwürdiges Eigentum an Daten, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 18. 11. 2016, 16.
43 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13 sqq.
44 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Building a European Data 
Economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 13. Such risks are the “possibility of design errors, malfunction-
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could be done by relying on existing liability rules (including product liability45) 
or by introducing new liability rules such as a special, strict liability for data-
generating products. As already mentioned under III., the specific perspective 
of the discussion about property rights allocating the use of data liability rules is 
interesting due to a possible parallel attribution of risks and benefits.46 To create 
such a parallel attribution by introducing matching liability and property rules 
makes sense from an economic point of view as an internalisation of negative 
and positive externalities. Regulatory law only has to step in where necessary.47
VI. Conclusions
Thanks to the Commissions’ Notice, the object of the discussion about “data 
ownership” has been well shaped and defined. The legislator’s final decision 
cannot yet be foreseen, even though it seems that the majority of comments are 
critical. The results of the European Commission’s public consultation will be of 
critical importance. The discussion about rights to data is no longer regarded as 
a question of property rights in data carriers48 but has finally arrived at intellec-
tual property jurisprudence. This is a positive step when seen from a legal dog-
matic perspective. Since data are not tangible but intangible goods with all their 
peculiarities, the current debate is most welcome regardless of whether a data 
producer’s right will ever be introduced or not.
Zusammenfassung
Die Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission „Building a European Data Economy“ vom 10. 
Januar 2017 enthält unter anderem den Vorschlag ein „data producer’s right“ einzuführen. 
Die Frage, ob ein solches Ausschließlichkeitsrecht an Daten eingeführt werden soll, oder 
nicht, wurde in der Literatur bereits ausführlich diskutiert. Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet 
sich dagegen in erster Linie der möglichen Ausgestaltung eines solchen Datenhersteller-
rechts. Er orientiert sich dabei an den aktuellen Vorschlägen der Kommission, die das Kon-
zept eines möglichen „Dateneigentums“ bereits sehr präzise und dogmatisch konsistent 
ing or manipulation in every device”; ibid., 14; cf. Zech, Zivilrechtliche Haftung für den Einsatz 
von Robotern – Zuweisung von Automatisierungs- und Autonomierisiken, in: Gless/Seelmann 
(eds.), Intelligente Agenten und das Recht, 163, 165 sqq.
45 Cf. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products.
46 Fn. 29.
47 For a possible regulation ensuring consumers’ choice between data generating and “data free” 
products, see Becker, p. 371 in this issue.
48 See the ruling of the BGH (German Federal Supreme Court) which still classifies the purchase 
of software as a purchase of physical data carriers, BGH 15 November 2006, XII ZR 120/04, 
NJW 2007, 2394 – Application Service Providing; cf. Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand, 
332 sqq.
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aufzeigen. Damit soll jedoch nicht die Frage, ob ein solches Recht aus ökonomischen oder 
anderen Gründen eingeführt werden sollte, oder nicht, auf die Seite gedrängt werden. Die 
Kommissionsmitteilung stellt ausdrücklich klar, dass ein data producer’s right nur ein mög-
licher Baustein eines zukünftigen Europäischen Rechtsrahmens für die Datenwirtschaft ist. 
Auch auf die Schaffung nicht-exklusiver Vermögensrechte als mögliche Alternative wird 
ausführlicher eingegangen.
